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1. Introduction 
      A worker can benefit from the concentration of other workers in the same workplace; 
such benefits are called labor market agglomeration economies. Parallel to the concept of 
business agglomeration economies, benefits from the concentration of same-industry 
workers are called labor market Marshallian externalities, while benefits from the 
concentration of diverse industries and city scale are called labor market Jacobs externalities 
(Andini et al., 2013; Fu, 2007; Groot et al., 2014).1 Both types of labor market agglomeration 
economies can enhance workers’ productivity and therefore wages if workers are paid by 
their marginal product revenue. This paper examines whether workers, particularly rural 
migrants, can benefit from labor market Marshallian externalities in manufacturing 
industries in Chinese cities. 
      Labor market agglomeration economies occur in employment clusters mainly through 
two channels: labor market pooling and knowledge spillovers (Moretti, 2011). A large, dense, 
local labor market improves matching quality between workers and firms, reduces frictional 
unemployment due to statistical economies (Gan and Zhang, 2006; Helsley and Strange, 
1990; Overman and Puga, 2007), and facilitates job mobility (Freedman, 2008). These 
benefits are generally called labor market pooling effect. Knowledge spillover effects, often 
also dubbed human capital externalities, refer to a worker’s learning from other workers in 
the same local market through formal and informal social interactions, such as imitating, 
social networking, job hopping, poaching, and learning by doing (Brunello and Gambarotto, 
2007; Eriksson and Lindgren, 2009; Moretti, 2004a,c; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008). Labor 
market Marshallian externalities also operate through these channels. 
      Empirical studies on labor market agglomeration economies mainly focus on Jacobs 
externalities in urban labor markets in developed countries, particularly, on city size wage 
                                                          
1  Traditionally, business agglomeration economies are classified into two types: localization economies 
resulting from the concentration of same-industry firms in a city and urbanization economies resulting from 
the concentration of different-industry firms in a city. In the dynamic context, the counterparts of localization 
and urbanization economies are dubbed Marshallian externalities and Jacobs externalities (Glaeser et al., 1992; 
Henderson, 2003; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).  
 
3 
premium. For example, Glaeser and Maré (2001) find that workers receive higher wages in 
cities and do not experience wage loss when they leave cities, suggesting that cities help 
accumulate human capital through learning and knowledge spillovers. Yannow (2006) finds 
that one third of the city size wage premium is due to labor market agglomeration economies. 
Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and Fu and Ross (2013) also confirm that urban wage 
premium still persists after the worker endogenous sorting issue is taken into account.2 
      Only a few studies test the labor market Marshallian externalities.3 Fu (2007) finds that 
workers benefit from the concentration of same-industry or same-occupation workers in the 
Boston metropolitan area. In the Netherlands, doubling the employment share of an industry 
in a city can increase a worker’s wage by 2.9% (Groot et al., 2014). Andini et al. (2013) test 
various dimensions of labor market Marshallian externalities in Italian cities but find only 
weak support for both the labor market pooling and knowledge spillover effects. 
      Most of empirical studies on labor market agglomeration economies use data from 
developed countries, such as the US (Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Yannow, 2006), UK (Melo 
and Graham, 2009), France (Combes et al., 2008), Italy (Andini et al., 2013). Empirical 
studies on labor market agglomeration economies in developing countries, including China, 
are scant.4 Maria and Barufi (2014) find that high employment density is associated with 
high wages in the Brazilian formal labor market. Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find that in 
Mexico migration networks help reduce capital constraint for small business owners. Liu 
(2007) estimates the external returns to education in Chinese cities (measured by average 
schooling years in a city) using the 1988 and 1995 Chinese Household Income Projects 
survey data. Fu and Gabriel (2012) study how migration decisions are affected by the 
concentration of skilled workers in destination provinces in China. Xing and Zhang (2017) 
estimate a structural model using the 2005 China Inter-Census Population Survey data and 
find that rural migrants are willing to pay for living in big cities possibly for all kinds of 
agglomeration benefits that big cities offer. 
                                                          
2 Combes and Gobillon (2015) provide a thorough review on empirical studies on testing both business and 
labor market agglomeration economies. 
3 Many studies test Marshallian externalities in business sectors, see for example, Ellison et al. (2010); 
Henderson (2003); Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011); Rosenthal and Strange (2001). 
4 There are quite a few studies on business agglomeration in developing countries. For a review, see Combes 
and Gobillon (2015). 
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      We focus on testing labor market Marshallian externalities in China and pay special 
attention to rural migrants. China is having a rapid urbanization and many cities have been 
growing persistently due to large inflows of low-skilled rural migrants each year. According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the total number of rural migrants in 2015 is 
estimated to be 277 million, about one fifth of the country’s total population, and 77.4% of 
them have received less than high school education.5 Given that there are still institutional 
barriers to migration (Au and Henderson, 2006; Zhao, 2016), such as the residential 
registration (hukou) system restricting farmers from moving into cities freely and depriving 
them of employee benefits in cities and a high degree of local government intervention to 
cities (for example, growth control), it is natural to ask such questions: Do labor market 
agglomeration economies exist in Chinese cities? And if so, how large is the magnitude? Do 
rural migrants also benefit from labor market agglomeration economies given mobility 
barriers and their low educational attainment? 
      Using data from the 2005 China Inter-Census Population Survey and the 2004 
Manufacturing Census and following the standard wage model specifications in the 
agglomeration economies literature, we find that workers in general benefit from labor 
market Marshallian externalities in Chinese cities: the labor market pooling effect, measured 
by total employment in a two-digit industry in a city, and human capital externalities, 
measured by the share of workers who have a college degree or above in a two-digit industry 
in a city.  
The classical identification issue in the agglomeration economies literature is that 
workers may sort into different cities and industries based on unobserved city, industry, and 
individual characteristics. We define agglomeration variables at the city-industry cell and 
are able to control for city and industry fixed effects. This identification strategy also 
motivates our focus on Marshallian externalities. To deal with the issue of workers’ sorting 
based on unobserved individual ability, we follow the literature on using occupation 
attributes as a proxy for skills (Bacolod et al., 2009, 2010) and add worker occupation 
dummies as a proxy for unobserved worker ability. To test the robustness of our estimates, 
                                                          
5 Source (in Chinese): http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160428_1349713.html. 
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we split the sample by local residents who never moved and migrants, by young and old 
workers. Reassuringly, for subsamples of workers who are less likely to sort across cities 
and industries, our agglomeration estimates are very robust, particularly, for human capital 
externalities.  
Furthermore, we find that rural migrants also benefit from labor market agglomeration 
economies but benefit much less than do workers with an urban hukou or local workers who 
never moved. This is neither because most of rural migrants are low-skilled preventing them 
from reaping fully the benefits from agglomeration, nor because most of rural migrants work 
in informal sectors that generate few spillovers. We find that even in the sample of high-
skilled workers, rural migrants receive much fewer benefits from agglomeration. Based on 
other empirical evidence, we conjecture that this may be because rural migrants lack local 
social networks or they suffer from “double discrimination” in urban labor markets for being 
“rural” and being “migrants.” 
That rural migrants benefit from labor market agglomeration but benefit much less than 
do urban workers and local workers has important policy implications. The growth of urban 
population in China is mainly driven by rural-urban migration. Migrants have provided 
massive, low-cost labor force for growing manufacturing industries. But the low labor cost 
advantage of Chinese manufacturing industries is waning and the new trend of 
manufacturing industry development requires skilled labor. Furthermore, skilled workers are 
crucial for city growth because cities with a high share of skilled workers tend to grow 
persistently in terms of population, employment, and college graduates (Glaeser and Saiz, 
2004; Glaeser, 2005; Simon and Nardinelli, 2002). Such cities also generate high 
productivity, high quality of life (Shapiro, 2006), and more employment opportunities for 
low-skilled workers (Moretti, 2012). However, the majority of rural-urban migrants are low-
skilled, and college shares in most of the Chinese cities are low.6 How can Chinese cities 
make their unskilled workers become skilled?  
                                                          
6 In the US the average college share among adults (25 years old or above) in metropolitan areas is 32% in 
2010, and 41 metropolitan areas have college share above 30% (data source: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/31/us/education-in-metro-areas.html). College share among 
adults (25 years old or above) is 8.9% in China and 20.4% in urban China in 2010; only one city has college 
share above 30% (Beijing, 32.2%) (Calculated by authors based on the 2010 Census data). 
6 
Skills can be acquired through formal school education, or through formal or informal 
social interactions such as meetings, peer effect, imitating, social networking, etc. Although 
on-the-job training and adult continuation education are feasible, they are limited in scale. 
In addition, if poaching and free riding is a serious problem in a dense local labor market, 
employers may have less incentives to provide on-the-job training (Brunello and Gambarotto, 
2006; Muehlemann and Wolter, 2011). However, employment agglomeration provides a 
feasible channel for social interactions to occur on a daily base and this can promote 
matching, knowledge spillovers, and learning. If rural migrants indeed benefit from urban 
labor market agglomeration, this may be one of the ways through which Chinese cities can 
become more skilled. Local governments therefore can design and implement labor and 
urban development policies to help rural migrants gain from urban labor market 
agglomeration to improve their skills and accumulate human capital (for example, removing 
the hukou system). These implications echo the findings that African Americans benefit less 
from labor market agglomeration economies in the US cities (Ananat et al., 2013). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data; Section 3 
discusses the model specification and identification issues; Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We use two datasets to test labor market agglomeration economies in Chinese cities. 
The first dataset is based on the 2005 Inter-Decennial Census (1%) Population Survey 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. We obtained a one-fifth random 
sample of this census dataset. The population census data contains information on individual 
and household characteristics and labor market performance. The second dataset is the 2004 
manufacturing census, which surveyed all firms in manufacturing industries by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. It includes firm location, total employment by education 
categories, accounting and financial, and other firm characteristics variables and enables us 
to calculate precisely total employment by city, industry, and education. We merge the two 
datasets by city-industry cell, where industry is defined at the two-digit level and a district 
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of a large municipality is treated as a “city.”7 We then construct a set of agglomeration 
variables at the city-industry level for each worker based on where and in which industry 
she or he worked. Our approach is very similar to Moretti (2004b) where he merges the US 
firm census data with the US decennial population census data by metropolitan area-industry 
cell to estimate the effect of human capital externalities on firm productivity because 
education information is not available in the firm census data but available in the population 
census data. Using city-industry cell link also enables us to test labor market Marshallian 
externalities without worrying about worker sorting across cities and across industries since 
we can control for city and industry fixed effects and our identification comes from 
variations across city-industry cells.  
Wage is defined by annual labor income or salary divided by months worked, so our 
wage variable is monthly wage. To remove the influence of outliers, we winsorize the wage 
data at the top and bottom 0.25 percentile. We select only workers of primary working age 
(between 18 and 60). To ensure there are enough number of workers in each city-industry 
cell, we require at least 20 (unweighted) workers in a city-industry cell. Increasing the cutoff 
improves our estimation since this reduces measurement errors of our agglomeration 
variables. After dropping observations with missing values of required variables, we finally 
obtain a sample of 172,002 workers. This sample contains 35 industries, 71 occupations, 345 
cities, 7,832 city-industry cells. On average there are 33 two-digit manufacturing industries 
in a Chinese city. 
      Following the wage- and productivity-agglomeration literature (Andini et al., 2013; Fu 
and Ross, 2013; Moretti, 2004b), we construct two agglomeration variables for each city-
industry cell. The total employment in a city-industry cell measures intra-industry labor 
market pooling effect in a city, or how a worker benefits from the concentration of the same-
industry workers in a city. College share is calculated by the number of employees with an 
associate degree or above in a city-industry cell divided by the total employment in that city-
industry cell, measuring intra-industry human capital externalities or knowledge spillover 
                                                          
7 A few studies find that agglomeration economies are localized and decay with distance rapidly over space 
(Duranton and Overman, 2005; Fu, 2007; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008). Therefore, we treat a district of a 
large municipality as a city in this study. It would not be appropriate to treat a giant city such as Beijing as a 
single one for localized Marshallian externalities since Beijing has a population of over 15 million in 2005. 
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effects in a city. 8  Table 1 provides the summary statistics for our key variables. The 
variations in total employment and college share across city-industry cells are very large.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
3. Model Specification and Identification 
Following the literature on labor market agglomeration economies, we specify the 
following baseline model: 
,)ln(ln 321 ijkjjkjkikijk IreCollegeShaEmploymentXW        (1) 
where ijkWln is the natural logarithm of monthly wage of worker i working in industry j in 
city k. Independent variables are defined as follows.  
:k  city fixed effect, used to control for unobserved city attributes based on which workers 
may sort across cities. 
iX :  a vector of individual characteristics, containing a set of standard variables in a wage 
equation: age, age squared, gender, marital status, years of migration, education attainment 
(less than high school, high school, associate, college, and master degree or above), minority 
identity, and institutional variables that may affect individual wage, including whether a 
worker has an urban hukou, types of employers, and types of labor contract.9 
jkEmployment)ln( : the natural logarithm of total employment in manufacturing industry j in 
city k.  This measures labor market pooling effect within an industry in a city: how a worker 
benefits from the concentration of the same-industry workers in a city. 10 
                                                          
8 An associate degree refers to graduation from a two or three year college. 
9 Minority dummy is set to 0 if a worker belongs to Han and 1 if a worker belongs to non-Han ethnicity. 
Employer types include social organizations and public sector, state-owned enterprises, collectively-owned 
enterprises, proprietary, private enterprises, and others. Labor contract types include fixed-term contract, long 
term contract, and no contract. 
10 Alternatively, we can use total employment. But if we assume the production function is of Cobb-Douglas 
type and wage equals the marginal product of labor, then the logarithm of total employment is a preferred 
specification.  
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jkreCollegeSha : the share of employees with an associate degree or above in industry j in 
city k. It measures human capital externalities or knowledge spillover effects within an 
industry in a city. 
jI : denotes industry fixed effect, controlling for unobserved, industry-specific attributes that 
affect employment agglomeration. 
ijk : error term, may not be independent and identically distributed. We cluster the standard 
errors at the city-industry cell level. 
A few identification issues arise in estimating the coefficients of the two agglomeration 
variables: total employment and college share in a city-industry cell. The key concern is that 
workers may sort into different workplaces or industries based on some unobserved factors. 
We discuss them in turn. 
First, workers may sort into different cities based on unobservable city attributes. For 
example, rural migrants may prefer cities not far away from their home villages (Zhang and 
Zhao, 2013). Also cities may have different productive and consumption amenities that 
affect workers’ productivity and residential location choices. We include city fixed effects 
k  to control for this.  
Second, agglomeration economies may be specific to industries. For example, high-tech 
industries tend to generate stronger knowledge spillover effects (Henderson, 2003) while 
informal sectors are less likely to generate spillovers. We include industry fixed effects jI  
to control for this. 
After city and industry fixed effects are controlled, sorting across industries in a given 
city is less likely simply because there are not many industries available in a given city. This 
reasoning is similar to Bayer et al. (2008) in that conditional on a block group residents are 
less likely to sort across residential locations at the block level simply because housing 
markets at the block level are thin. The thought experiment of our identification strategy can 
be summarized as follows: two identical workers, W1 and W2, work in the same industry j 
in two identical cities, C1 and C2; the only thing different is that in city C1 the industry has 
10 
more workers and a larger share of college-educated workers. In this case, does worker W1 
have a higher productivity and therefore receive a higher wage than worker W2? 
Third, conditional on city and industry, sorting could still occur due to unobserved 
individual ability. For example, workers with better local social networks are more likely to 
work in industries where firm performance is more stable and employee fringe benefits are 
generous. Existing studies have used different approaches to deal with this issue. For 
example, Glaeser and Maré (2001) use individual panel data and control for individual fixed 
effects; Rosenthal and Strange (2008) use geographic features as instrumental variables (IV) 
for agglomeration variables to break the correlation between unobserved individual 
attributes and agglomeration; Moretti (2004c) uses a city’s historical demographic structure 
and the presence of a land-grant college as IVs; Fu and Ross (2013) use residential location 
at the census tract level as proxy for unobserved ability.11 Due to data constraint, we cannot 
employ any of them.  
However, an emerging literature uses occupation attributes to proxy for skills (Ingram 
and Neumann, 2006; Bacolod et al., 2009, 2010). The rationale is that in a competitive, 
frictionless labor market, if workers perfectly match their skills with job requirements, we 
can infer that a worker taking a certain job (occupation) should possess the required skills, 
and therefore, observed occupation (attribute) serves as a good proxy for ability (or a 
particular skill). We follow this reasoning and use a worker’s occupation to proxy for the 
worker’s unobserved ability. Occupation choice is endogenous in a wage model; but in our 
setting, the inclusion of occupation can help reduce the correlation between error term and 
the two agglomeration variables. A rule of thumb to test this method is to see whether the 
coefficients of education category variables become attenuated after the inclusion of 
occupation fixed effects since in general unobserved ability should be positively correlated 
with observed ability such as education attainment (Oster, 2017). 
Fourth, even if we include city, industry, and occupation fixed effects, these controls 
may still not be perfect, and it is still possible that workers sort into different city-industry 
cells based on unobservables. Since workers with a high degree of mobility are more likely 
                                                          
11 Recent studies have used randomized experiments (Afridi et al., 2015). 
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to sort across cities and industries than those with a low degree of mobility, we split the 
sample into migrants and local residents who never moved. If both types of workers benefit 
similarly from agglomeration, then sorting bias is not a serious problem. 
Fifth, China has transitioned from a planned economy to a market economy. Older 
workers who experienced the centrally planned economy and the transition period face more 
stringent mobility constraints: they are more likely to be affiliated with state-owned 
enterprises, having more family dependents, and with different human capital and skills that 
may not be easily transferable or adapted to market economy. That is, old workers tend to 
have low mobility, while young workers tend to have high mobility. Sorting bias should be 
stronger in the young worker subsample. We also estimate the models for the young and old 
worker subsamples separately to gauge the seriousness of sorting bias issue. 
Because our wage data is in 2005 and the agglomeration variables are measured in 2004 
from the manufacturing census data, it is the lagged labor market agglomeration that 
generates current wage premium. This data structure also to some degree mitigates the 
endogeneity concern that agglomeration and worker wage are simultaneously determined 
due to sorting.   
Model (1) is estimated for the full sample but also for a subsample of rural migrants. 
Complementary to the sample splits, we also interact rural and migrant dummies with 
agglomeration variables to check the robustness of results. The next section reports and 
discusses the empirical results. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Existence of labor market agglomeration economies 
To test whether labor market agglomeration economies exist in Chinese cities, we 
estimate different versions of Model (1). Table 2 presents the estimation results. Column 1 
reports the result of a simple wage model with individual attributes, agglomeration variables, 
and city fixed effects. The coefficients of the individual characteristics variables have 
expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. Both the coefficients of total employment and 
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college share in a city-industry cell are positive and statistically significant, suggesting the 
existence of Marshallian externalities in urban labor markets. But this result may be driven 
by industry specific attributes or individual sorting based on unobserved ability.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
    We add industry fixed effects to Column 1 and the coefficients of individual 
characteristics variables remain almost identical (Column 2), suggesting that there is little 
sorting across industries based on unobserved individual attributes. However, the coefficient 
of logarithmic total employment attenuates from 0.0052 to 0.0015 and becomes insignificant, 
suggesting that agglomeration benefit from same-industry peers in a city may be mainly 
industry-specific. The human capital externalities effect remains highly significant albeit 
attenuated by about 30% (from 0.5044 to 0.3431). These results suggest that conditional on 
industry-specific factors, substantial agglomeration economies, particularly, human capital 
externalities, still exist. 
      To test whether workers sort across industries in a given city based on unobserved ability 
biasing the estimates of agglomeration variables, we add occupation fixed effects to Column 
1, aiming to capture unobserved worker ability. Column 3 presents the result. As discussed 
in the previous section, if occupation fixed effects can absorb part of unobserved ability and 
since observed and unobserved ability should be positively correlated, then, the coefficients 
of education variables should attenuate significantly. Column 3 indeed shows that the 
coefficients of education variables do attenuate by between 15% and 24%. For example, the 
coefficient of college degree dummy decreases by 20%, from 0.7560 to 0.6032. This pattern 
is consistent with the findings in Fu and Ross (2013) where residential fixed effects are used 
to proxy for unobserved worker ability. After controlling for unobserved ability, we still find 
substantial human capital externalities (coefficient of college share is 0.4621 and statistically 
significant). 
Column 4 adds both industry and occupation fixed effects. This baseline model 
specification is preferred since we have controlled for city- and industry-specific attributes 
and unobserved ability. The result suggests that although not statistically significant, 
doubling the employment size of an industry in a city increases the wage of a worker in that 
13 
industry by 0.29%. This is a very conservative estimate since industry employment is very 
likely to have measurement errors and individual sorting may not be perfectly controlled for. 
12 On the other hand, human capital externalities remain important and significant: a one 
percentage point increase in college share of an industry-city cell raises a worker’s wage by 
about 0.36% (or a one standard deviation increase in college share in an industry-city cell 
raises wage by about 3.06%). Interestingly, this magnitude is in line with other estimates in 
the literature. Moretti (2004c) uses the US census data and finds that a one percentage point 
increase in college share (in a city) raises average wages by 0.6–1.2%. Using the 2007 
American Community Survey data, Winters (2011) finds that a one percentage point increase 
in college share (in a city) raises average wages by 0.41–0.48%. 
 
To check the robustness of our preferred specification, we estimate the baseline model by 
a set of sample splits: local residents who never moved versus migrants, migrants with below 
or above median migrating years (2.5 years), and workers with below or above median ages 
(33 years old). Compared with migrants, inexperienced migrants, and young workers, local 
residents, experienced migrants, and old workers should have less sorting due to stronger 
social network and more attachment to family and housing. The results presented in Table 3 
confirm this conjecture. Column 1 replicates the baseline model result (Column 4 of Table 
2). Columns 2 and 3 show that compared with migrants, local workers benefit more from 
both labor market pooling and human capital externalities, suggesting that the existence of 
labor market agglomeration economies cannot be due to worker sorting. Columns 4 and 5 
show that compared with new migrants, experienced migrants benefit more from both labor 
market pooling and human capital externalities, suggesting that working in cities longer 
helps develop social network and accumulate human capital through learning from peers. 
This is consistent with the idea of learning in cities by Glaeser and Maré (2001). Similar 
patterns hold for young versus old workers as indicated in Columns 6 and 7.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
                                                          
12  When we select city-industry employment greater than 300 workers to reduce measurement errors, the 
coefficient of ln(Employment) is 0.0068 and significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient of college share 
remains similar (0.3969 significant at the 1% level). 
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     Taking together the results from Tables 2 and 3, we conclude that there exist 
economically important labor market Marshallian externalities in manufacturing industries 
in Chinese cities. Specifically, there is weak evidence for labor market pooling effect but 
strong and robust evidence for human capital externalities effect in Chinese urban labor 
markets. 
4.2 Rural migrants benefit from labor market agglomeration economies 
      Given the massive migration from rural areas to cities during the past decades in China 
and that many rural migrants work in manufacturing industries, it is natural and important 
to test whether rural migrants benefit from agglomeration economies in urban labor markets. 
We estimate the baseline model for the subsample of rural migrants.13 Column 1 of Table 4 
shows that rural migrants benefit significantly from labor market Marshallian externalities. 
Specifically, for rural migrants working in a two-digit manufacturing industry in a city, 
doubling the industry employment size in that city increases the wage by 1.23%; a ten 
percentage point increase in college share in that industry located in that city increases the 
wage by 2.1%. These findings are robust to subsamples of rural migrants with less or more 
migration experience (Columns 2 and 3) and to subsamples of young or old workers 
(Columns 4 and 5), except that human capital externalities effect is not statistically 
significant for experienced rural migrants.14 To summarize, rural migrants in general also 
benefit from labor market agglomeration economies in Chinese cities.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
       This finding is consistent with some existing evidence that low-skilled workers also 
benefit from human capital externalities. Using the 1980 and 1990 US Census data, Moretti 
(2004c) finds that a one percentage point increase in college share in a city raises high school 
drop-outs’ wages by 1.9% and high school graduates’ wages by 1.6%. Using the 2000 
Census data, Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and Winters (2014) also find that workers with 
less than a college degree benefit from the concentration of college graduates in cities. Our 
                                                          
13 A worker is a rural-urban migrant if he or she has a rural hukou and stayed in a city for more than six 
months.  
14 Peri (2002) finds that young workers tend to learn more in dense labor market while old workers decrease 
learning.  
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finding is also consistent with a recent study by Yu et al. (2017). They use the 2007 China 
Household Income Project data and find that rural migrants who have worked in other 
provinces are more likely to become entrepreneurs when they return home, suggesting that 
rural migrants have accumulated human capital in cities.  
 
4.3 Rural migrants benefit less than do local, urban workers 
      A careful comparison reveals that although rural migrants benefit from labor market 
agglomeration economies in Chinese cities, they benefit much less than do workers with an 
urban hukou or workers who are local. Table 5 presents a set of such results. To facilitate 
comparison, Columns 1 and 2 replicate the baseline results for the full sample (Column 4 of 
Table 2) and for the rural migrants sample (Column 1 of Table 4). It is striking that rural 
migrants benefit 42% less than the full sample in terms of human capital externalities. Such 
an under-compensation pattern persists compared with workers with an urban hukou 
(Column 3), workers who are local residents in a city regardless of hukou (Column 4), 
workers who are local urban residents (Column 5), and urban workers moving across cities 
(who are in general skilled) (Column 6). These results imply that rural workers benefit much 
less from human capital externalities in two dimensions—being “rural” and being “migrants.”  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
      In terms of labor market pooling effect, although it is not informative to compare the 
rural migrants subsample with the full sample, it is straightforward to see that rural migrants 
benefit 30% to 40% less compared with workers with an urban hukou (Column 3), workers 
who are local urban residents (Column 5), and urban workers moving across cities (Column 
6). Again, this pattern hints that rural workers benefit much less from labor market pooling 
in an industry in a city in two dimensions—being “rural” and being “migrants.” 
      To make use of the full sample information, we create four dummy variables for these 
four worker categories: urban migrants, rural migrants, local urban, and local rural workers. 
We choose local urban workers as the default category and interact the other three category 
dummies with the two agglomeration variables while keeping their main effects. Column 7 
of Table 5 presents the results. For labor market pooling effects, local urban workers benefit 
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significantly: doubling industrial employment size increases their wage by 1.18%; workers 
with an urban hukou and moving across cities (urban migrants) enjoy additional benefit of 
0.93%. However, local rural workers suffer a penalty of 1.38% less compared with local 
urban workers; more strikingly, rural migrants suffer a penalty of 2.40% less compared with 
local urban workers. A similar pattern holds for human capital externalities: a ten percentage 
point increase in college share in a city-industry cell increases the wage of local urban 
workers by 5.5%; urban migrants enjoy similar benefit. However, both local rural workers 
and rural migrants suffer 6% less compared with local urban workers. All these results again 
suggest that rural migrants benefit less from labor market agglomeration economies because 
of their being “non-urban” and “non-local.” 15 
4.4 Why do rural migrants benefit less? 
      Why do rural migrants benefit much less from labor market agglomeration economies 
compared with local, urban residents? We cannot fully answer this question in this study but 
it seems there are at least three possible explanations. First, most of rural migrants are low-
skilled with less education attainment (98.56% of rural migrants finished only high school 
or less education in our sample) and work in low-tech industries, which may prevent them 
from learning from other workers in the same industry.16 Second, rural migrants lack social 
networks in cities preventing them finding better jobs and learning from spillovers. Third, 
rural migrants are discriminated in the urban labor markets because they are non-urban and 
non-local. We are unable to test the second and the third but can rule out the first. 
      To test whether low education attainment hinders rural migrants reaping fully the benefit 
from labor market agglomeration economies, we estimate the baseline model for subsamples 
of low-skilled (high school diploma or below) and high-skilled (associate degree or above) 
workers. Table 6 reports the results. Column 1 shows that although the benefit from labor 
market pooling is not statistically significant, low-skilled workers do benefit significantly 
                                                          
15 These findings are in contrast to some empirical evidence based on the US data. Moretti (2004c) finds that 
workers with high school or less education benefit more from human capital externalities than do college 
graduates. Rosenthal and Strange (2008) find that both college and non-college educated workers can benefit 
from urbanization economies (measured by total employment) and human capital externalities and the 
difference is minor. 
16 Many rural migrants work in informal sectors and those sectors generally generate little knowledge 
spillovers. Our model specifications have included industry fixed effects and can rule out this interpretation. 
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from human capital externalities (coefficient is 0.3112), more so than rural migrants 
(coefficient is 0.2095). Column 2 shows that for low-skilled worker sample, being “rural” 
deprives them of almost all the benefit from both types of agglomeration economies. Column 
3 further shows that being “migrant” (being “nonlocal”) wipes out all benefit from labor 
market pooling, possibly due to their lack of local social networks. Columns 4-6 present the 
same set of results for high-skilled workers. Although for high-skilled workers, being 
“migrant” does not affect their ability to reap agglomeration benefit, being “rural” is very 
harmful, making the benefit from agglomeration economies almost disappear.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
       As a robustness check, we also report the interactive model results in Table 7, using 
local urban workers as the default category. Column 1 replicates the interactive model for 
the full sample (Column 7 of Table 5). Columns 2 and 3 reveal the same pattern as in Table 
6 that rural migrants, whether they are low-skilled or high-skilled, receive much less benefit 
from agglomeration economies.17 Taking together, we can infer that it is not education 
disparity, but the disparity in terms of rural and urban hukou, nonlocal and local residence 
that prevent rural migrants reaping the full benefit from urban labor market agglomeration 
economies.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
      Rural migrants generally lack local social networks compared with local urban residents; 
they may be discriminated by urban residents and employers. Either or both can explain why 
rural migrants benefit much less from labor market agglomeration economies than do local 
urban workers. Lack of social networks may be partially due to discrimination. We cannot 
distinguish or test these two hypotheses in the current study, but many existing studies based 
on micro data tend to support both hypotheses.  
      Using the 2010 population census data from Shanghai, Liu et al. (2016) find that 
residential neighborhoods in Shanghai are highly segregated by hukou and migration status: 
local urban residents concentrate in the central city (with rich urban amenities and high-
                                                          
17 The only exception is that the coefficient of college share interacting with rural migrant dummy for high-
skilled workers (Column 3 of Table 7) is marginally significant (at the 15% level). 
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quality public services), rural migrants in the outer suburban areas, and urban migrants in 
the between. They also find that living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of rural 
migrants can significantly increase a rural migrant’s likelihood of being employed, 
suggesting that rural migrants’ social networks are very localized and limited. Using the 
2007 Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) data, Chen et al. (2015) find 
that two thirds of rural migrants in China search jobs through informal social networks but 
they receive much lower wage if they find jobs through social networks.18  Zax (2016) 
explores extensive micro datasets (multiple waves of China Income Project data) and finds 
that returns to education of urban workers vary substantially and persistently across 
provinces and years, implying strong barriers (such as hukou) preventing workers moving 
freely across regions in China. Recent field experiments also document discrimination 
against rural hukou migrants (Afridi et al., 2015). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Agglomeration economies in urban labor markets have attracted much attention in 
developed countries. This paper offers a complementary evidence for labor market 
agglomeration economies in Chinese cities. We find that in general workers benefit from 
Marshallian externalities, including intra-industry labor market pooling effect and human 
capital externalities in cities. These findings are robust to various sorting bias tests. We also 
find that although rural migrants benefit from labor market agglomeration economies, they 
benefit much less than do workers who have an urban hukou or who are local. We provide 
evidence to show that this is not because rural migrants are generally low-skilled preventing 
them from reaping fully the benefit from labor market agglomeration economies. The two 
alternative interpretations could be that rural migrants lack local social networks and that 
they are discriminated by local urban residents and employers. Testing these two hypotheses 
warrants future studies. 
                                                          
18 In other developing countries low-skilled workers also tend to find jobs through social networks (see for 
example, Wahba and Zenou, 2005). 
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That rural migrants cannot benefit fully from urban labor market agglomeration 
economies has important policy ramifications. The growth of population and employment 
in Chinese cities is mainly driven by massive rural-urban migration, implying that the skill 
intensity in many Chinese cities becomes diluted. Globalization and outsourcing of 
manufacturing firms from China to other developing countries has strongly motivated 
Chinese cities to become “skilled” to gain competitive advantage. Although some cities start 
to subsidize rural migrants for attending vocational schools (for example, Chengdu), it is 
unlikely to send most rural migrants back to school to receive formal education. However, 
social interactions in cities, especially in dense urban labor markets, provide another channel 
of learning and human capital accumulation. Designing policies to help rural migrants gain 
fully the benefit from urban labor market agglomeration to improve their productivity is a 
pressing task. Such policies should help develop an open, tolerant urban social milieu. An 
immediate policy suggestion would be to remove the hukou barrier and allow rural migrants 
to enjoy the same employee benefits and public services as do local urban residents. This 
can facilitate rural migrants to settle down in cities and to be integrated into urban society 
and urban culture. Fortunately, the Chinese government policies are moving toward this 
direction.19 
  
                                                          
19 Xiaobo Wu, Hukou reform under way in 29 regions across China. Web link: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-04/29/content_24966027.htm. 
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            Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables  
Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Wage (monthly, yuan) 956 707 100 10000 
Male 0.544 0.498 0 1 
Age 33.310 9.980 18 60 
Single 0.263 0.440 0 1 
Minority 0.042 0.201 0 1 
High school 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Associate 0.063 0.243 0 1 
College 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Graduate 0.002 0.047 0 1 
Urban hukou 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Migrating year 1.211 1.922 0 6 
Employment (of a city-industry) 81,805 123,834 20 773,914 
College share (of a city-industry) 0.113 0.085 0 1 
Sample size 172,002 
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               Table 2: Labor market agglomeration economies  
1 2 3 4 
Male 0.2189*** 0.2135*** 0.2080*** 0.2060*** 
(30.23) (35.78) (36.82) (37.85) 
Age 0.0124*** 0.0120*** 0.0117*** 0.0114*** 
(9.49) (9.78) (10.27) (10.04) 
Age squared -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
(-11.17) (-11.65) (-12.55) (-12.29) 
Single -0.0651*** -0.0641*** -0.0555*** -0.0554*** 
(-10.17) (-10.08) (-10.04) (-10.12) 
Minority -0.0562*** -0.0531*** -0.0492*** -0.0477*** 
(-7.31) (-7.11) (-6.56) (-6.42) 
High school 0.1330*** 0.1322*** 0.1008*** 0.1004*** 
(23.57) (22.47) (26.64) (26.91) 
Associate  0.4284*** 0.4250*** 0.3226*** 0.3200*** 
(31.01) (31.02) (33.12) (33.56) 
College 0.7560*** 0.7522*** 0.6032*** 0.6005*** 
(26.67) (26.81) (28.84) (29.53) 
Graduate 1.3198*** 1.3097*** 1.1195*** 1.1132*** 
(29.55) (29.48) (31.21) (31.45) 
Urban hukou 0.0297*** 0.0375*** 0.0166** 0.0217***  
(2.51) (3.49) (2.20) (2.93) 
Migrating year 0.0113*** 0.0114*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
(8.64) (9.51) (8.79) (8.91) 
ln(Employment) 0.0052* 0.0015 0.0019 0.0029 
(1.72) (0.36) (0.66) (0.74) 
College share 0.5044*** 0.3431*** 0.4621*** 0.3598*** 
(9.97) (5.36) (10.03) (6.10) 
Industry fixed effects N Y N Y 
Occupation fixed effects N N Y Y 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.44 
Note: City fixed effects, employee type, and work contract type dummies are included. Standard 
errors are clustered at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in parentheses. “*”, “**”, and 
“***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Sample size: 172,002. 
  
25 
 
 
Table 3: Labor market agglomeration economies: robustness checks  
1 
Baseline 
 
2 
Local 
3 
Migrants 
4 
<2.5 
years 
5 
≥2.5 
years 
6 
Below 
median age 
7 
Above 
median age 
ln(Employment) 0.0029 0.0111** 0.0015 -0.0018 0.0147*** 0.0018 0.0071 
(0.74) (1.91) (0.47) (-0.51) (3.40) (0.50) (1.49) 
College share 0.3598*** 0.3473*** 0.2812*** 0.2285*** 0.3454*** 0.3228*** 0.3847*** 
(6.10) (5.06) (3.87) ()3.05 (3.22) (5.26) (5.63) 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.44 0.45 
Sample size 172,002 97,478 74,524 34,975 39,549 91,426 80,576 
Note: All models include the same set of independent variables as those in Column 4 of Table 2 
except that Column 2 excludes migrating years. Median migrating year is 2.5. Median age is 33 in 
the full sample. Standard errors are clustered at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in 
parentheses. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4: Rural migrants benefit from labor market agglomeration economies   
1 
Rural migrants 
sample 
2 
Below median 
migrating years 
3 
Above median  
migrating years 
4 
Below median 
 age 
5 
Above median 
age 
ln(Employment) 0.0123*** 0.0128** 0.0115
** 0.0181*** 0.0104** 
(2.70) (2.20) (2.26) (3.02) (2.19) 
College share 0.2095** 0.3551*** 0.1119 0.2209
* 0.2381** 
(1.93) (2.64) (0.93) (1.67) (2.07) 
Adj. R2 0.30 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.35 
Sample size 49,916 23,302 266,14 25,260 24,656 
Note: All models include the same set of independent variables as those in Column 4 of Table 2. 
Columns 2 and 3 use subsamples below or above median migrating years (cutoff is 2.5 years); 
Columns 4 and 5 use subsamples below or above median age (cutoff is 26). Standard errors are 
clustered at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in parentheses. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 5: Rural migrants benefit less than do local, urban workers   
1 
Full  
sample 
2 
Rural 
migrants 
3 
Urban 
4 
Local 
5 
Local 
urban 
6 
Urban 
migrants 
7 
Interactive 
model 
ln(Employment) 0.0029 0.0123*** 0.0178*** 0.0111** 0.0197
*** 0.0181** 0.0118** 
(0.74) (2.70) (5.23) (1.91) (5.60) (2.27) (1.97) 
ln(Employment)× 
Urban×Migrant 
      0.0093
** 
    
  (1.94) 
ln(Employment)× 
Local×Rural 
      -0.0138
*** 
    
  (-2.79) 
ln(Employment) × 
Rural×Migrant 
      -0.0240
*** 
    
  (-3.21) 
College share 0.3598*** 0.2095** 0.3483*** 0.3473*** 0.3287
*** 0.5133*** 0.5539*** 
(6.10) (1.93) (6.10) (5.06) (5.39) (3.71) (8.81) 
College share× 
Urban×Migrant 
      0.0366 
    
  (0.49) 
College share× 
Local×Rural 
      -0.6150
*** 
    
  (-8.03) 
College share× 
Rural×Migrant 
      -0.5883
*** 
    
  (-4.76) 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.30 0.53 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.44 
Sample size 172,002 49,916 66,827 97,478 57,431 9,396 172,002 
Note: All models include the same set of independent variables as those in Column 4 of Table 2. 
Column 7 also includes dummies for urban migrant, local rural, and rural migrant categories. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in parentheses. “*”, “**”, 
and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 6: Low-skilled versus high-skilled worker samples  
1 
Low 
skilled 
2 
Low 
skilled 
3 
Low 
skilled 
4 
High 
skilled 
5 
High 
skilled 
6 
High 
skilled 
ln(Employment) 0.0029 0.0100* 0.0052 0.0140** 0.0174*** 0.0167** 
(0.72) (1.86) (1.18) (2.37) (2.89) (2.40) 
ln(Employment) × 
Rural 
 -0.0128
***   -0.0382**  
 (-3.21)   (-3.45)  
ln(Employment) × 
Migrant 
  -0.0094
**   -0.0102 
  (-2.02)   (-0.77) 
College share 0.3112*** 0.5365*** 0.3220*** 0.5037*** 0.5168*** 0.4992*** 
(5.48) (8.30) (5.37) (6.42) (6.66) (6.26) 
College share× 
Rural 
 -0.5555
***   -0.5765***  
 (-7.89)   (-2.49)  
College share× 
Migrant 
  -0.0740   0.0353 
  (-0.81)   (0.25) 
Adj. R2 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Sample size 156,034 156,034 156,034 15,968 15,968 15,968 
Note: All models include individual attributes variables, city, industry, and occupation fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in parentheses. “*”, “**”, 
and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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   Table 7: Interactive models by skill  
1 
Full sample 
2 
Low-skilled workers 
3 
High-skilled workers 
ln(Employment) 0.0118** 0.0077 0.0178
*** 
(1.97) (1.32) (2.53) 
ln(Employment) ×Urban ×Migrant 0.0093** 0.0002 -0.0038 
(1.94) (0.03) (-0.30) 
ln(Employment) ×Local ×Rural -0.0138*** -0.0072
* -0.0188 
(-2.79) (-1.64) (-1.20) 
ln(Employment) ×Rural ×Migrant -0.0240*** -0.0139
** -0.0458*** 
(-3.21) (-2.38) (-2.62) 
College share 0.5539*** 0.5379
*** 0.5086*** 
(8.81) (8.26) (6.38) 
College share ×Urban ×Migrant 0.0366 -0.0928 0.0528 
(0.49) (-1.12) (0.39) 
College share ×Local ×Rural -0.6150*** -0.5798
*** -0.5835** 
(-8.03) (-7.55) (-2.00) 
College share ×Rural ×Migrant -0.5883*** -0.4996
*** -0.5028 
(-4.76) (-4.35) (-1.49) 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.35 0.52 
Sample size 172,002 156,034 15,968 
Note: All models include individual attributes variables, city, industry, occupation fixed effects, and 
dummies for urban migrant, local rural, and rural migrant categories. Standard errors are clustered 
at the city-industry cell level. t statistics are in parentheses. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 
 
